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LAW: JUST ANOTHER PIECE OF EVIDENCE, 
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Summary:   The effects of a defendant’s confession are not the same in all legal orders. In civil 
law systems, confession is usually perceived as an ordinary piece of evidence, 
while in common law culture it is considered a guilty plea whose truthfulness 
is not to be questioned by the judge. However, this broad differentiation is not 
straightforward. In Croatia, if a defendant confesses to a criminal offence 
punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to five years at the main hearing and 
agrees to the sentence proposed by the prosecutor, the trial court is not allowed 
to impose a sentence higher than the one proposed by the prosecutor. This can 
motivate tacit agreements and unregulated negotiations between the parties 
after the main hearing has already begun, and it is unclear if the legislator had 
such a scenario in mind when enacting this provision. In order to elucidate these 
problems in a broader perspective, the authors have analysed Croatian, German, 
Austrian, French, Italian and English law, with an emphasis on the position of 
the defendant after a confession at the main hearing, the effects of the confession, 
the role of the court in further proceedings and the victim’s rights. After the 
comparative analysis, the authors presented their opinion on the current legal 
situation in Croatia, especially Art. 417a (6) and (7) of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, together with a proposal for legislative changes.
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1. INTrodUCTIoN
In Croatian law, the defendant is traditionally perceived as a possible source of information 
regarding the facts that are to be determined during the criminal proceedings, which is why it 
is vital to ensure his/her presence in the trial process.1 The right to defence includes the right 
to remain silent and not to answer any questions regarding the indictment, but the defendant 
usually chooses to give a testimony and present evidence in his/her favour, or at least to plead 
guilty or not guilty at the main hearing as the central stage of the criminal proceedings. The 
content of the plea is vital for the further course of the main hearing, as it determines whether 
the defendant shall give his/her testimony immediately following the plea or only at the end 
of the presentation of evidence, unless otherwise requested by the defendant (Art. 417.a (1) 
and (5) C-CCP).2
A guilty plea does not preclude Croatian courts from gathering and presenting other ev-
idence: only if the confession of the defendant is “complete and in accordance with the evi-
dence already gathered”, the court shall proceed with the presentation of evidence related to 
the decision on the sentence (Art. 417.a (4) C-CCP); otherwise, the court shall continue with 
the presentation of evidence related to the matter of guilt. This rule is difficult to grasp with-
out a broader comparative context, as the effects of confession are fundamentally related to 
the issue of the purpose of criminal proceedings and the role of the relevant court. The essen-
tial question is whether the defendant`s guilt should be established by evidence, as in the civil 
law tradition, or whether the defendant’s admission of guilt would lead to the termination of 
the criminal proceedings and the court is not obligated to further verify it, as in the common 
law tradition.3 This shall be covered in more detail throughout the paper.
Regardless of this divergence between the common law and the civil law model, in the 
last decades, many European countries have been facing major reforms of the criminal justice 
systems in a quest for a procedure that would be more consensus-oriented, primarily in order 
to improve its expedience, but also to strengthen the position of the victim. Some of these 
reforms are in direct conflict with the guiding ideas of the Continental criminal procedure, but 
they also fail to implement the ideas underlying the concept of consensual justice. Hence, they 
remain trapped between the two concepts of criminal justice while retaining the shortcomings 
of both of them. A prime example is found in Art. 417.a (6) and (7) C-CCP, which fails to en-
sure an exhaustive, court-controlled presentation of evidence and to improve the position of 
the victim. This provision shall be analysed and compared to the legislative regimes in other 
countries.
In addition to Croatia, our research also includes Germany, as the exemplary civil law role 
model, Austria, which shares a common legal heritage with Croatia, France, as a cradle of 
the “mixed” criminal procedure, Italy, as an example of a civil law system which has adopted 
a great deal of common law solutions, and England, as a representative of the common law 
1  Tomašević, G., Kazneno procesno pravo, Opći dio: Temeljni pojmovi, Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Splitu, Split, 2011, pp. 136.
2  Croatian Code of Criminal Procedure (C-CCP), Official Gazette, No. 152/08, 76/09, 80/11, 91/12 – Decision and Ruling of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, 143/12, 56/13, 145/13, 152/14, 70/17, and 126/19.
3  Specer, J. R., Evidence, in European Criminal Procedures (eds. Delmas_marty, M., Spencer, J.R.), Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2006, pp. 594-595.
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tradition. The primary aim is to explore the effects of a guilty plea, i.e. confession, at the main 
hearing together with the impact of tacit agreements and sentencing proposals of the prose-
cution on the sentencing powers of the court and the position of victim. This is followed with 
a proposal for legislative amendments.
2.  CroATIA: bETWEEN THE PrINCIPLE of SUbSTANTIvE TrUTH ANd ITS 
NEGATIoN
The duty of the court to establish the relevant facts in the criminal proceedings, known 
as the principle of substantive truth (načelo materijalne istine), was expressly stated in the 
Yugoslav and Croatian Code of Criminal Procedure (Zakon o krivičnom postupku) before 1998, 
but the statutory law has not addressed it ever since. Some notable Croatian authors have 
condemned this principle as a “normative disguise for raw state power” and a remnant of 
totalitarianism,4 while others have supported it as a backbone of the most renowned Conti-
nental criminal procedures (e. g. French, German and Austrian)5 and emphasised that it is still 
an integral part of the Croatian criminal proceedings.6
The latter view is well-grounded as the current Croatian CCP (Zakon o kaznenom postupku) 
contains a great number of rules which clearly express the duty of the court to establish the 
facts ex officio in the criminal proceedings. One of the notable examples thereof is Art. 417.a 
(3) and (4) which states that a confession of the defendant at the main hearing “does not re-
lease the court from the duty to present other evidence”. Interestingly, this provision does not 
only proclaim the duty of the court to inspect truthfulness of the defendant’s confession at 
the main hearing, but it also implicitly states the duty of the court to present evidence, i.e. to 
establish the facts of the case. This proves that the Croatian criminal procedure is still a part of 
the civil law tradition, which does not regard criminal trial as a “competition” (or a dialogue) 
between the parties, but as a judge-dominated procedure whose purpose is to establish the 
relevant facts and apply substantive law. The C-CCP determines its own purpose accordingly: 
it “lays down rules to ensure that no innocent person is convicted and that the perpetrator of a 
criminal offence is sentenced under the conditions provided by law and on the basis of lawfully 
conducted proceedings before a competent court” (Art. 1).
The duty of the court to “present other evidence” when the defendant makes a confes-
sion at the main hearing does not only encompass evidence which is significant for the issue 
of his/her guilt, but also the evidence which is relevant for sentencing. That evidence shall 
be presented even where the defendant’s confession at the main hearing is “complete and 
in accordance with the previously obtained evidence” (Art. 417.a (3) and (4)). In some cases, 
however, the court’s powers and duties to determine the sentence are completely handed over 
to the prosecutor. This applies to the cases in which criminal proceedings are conducted for a 
criminal offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment of up to five years, provided that the 
4  Krapac, D. i suradnici, Kazneno procesno pravo, Prva knjiga institucije, Narodne novine, Zagreb, 2015, pp. 85-86.
5  Đurđević, Rekonstrukcija, judicijalizacija, konstitucionalizacija, europeizacija hrvatskog kaznenog postupka V. novelom ZKP/08: 
prvi dio?, HLJKPP 2/2013, 335-342.
6  Ljubanović, V., Novokmet, A., Tomičić, Z., Kazneno procesno pravo – izabrana poglavlja, PRAVOS, Osijek, 2019, pp. 286-288.
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defendant has pleaded guilty and agreed to the sentence proposed by the prosecutor (Art. 
417.a (6)). Under these conditions, “the court may not impose another type of sentence or 
other measure prescribed by criminal law, or a higher sentence than the one proposed” by the 
prosecutor (Art. 417.a (7)).
 The purpose of these provisions is straightforward: the legislator aimed to expedite 
the criminal proceedings by motivating the defendant to confess in exchange for a relatively 
lenient sentence. This legislative solution has established itself in the Croatian law in 1998 as 
an important feature of the summary procedure, surviving various regulatory regimes in the 
meantime, including the very abolishment of this type of procedure.7 It has been applied by 
the Croatian courts, including the Supreme Court.8 Yet, its very existence is surprising from a 
comparative perspective as well as from the standpoint of the basic principles of the Croatian 
criminal procedure. Personal liberty is one of the fundamental human rights enshrined in 
the Croatian Constitution9 and its deprivation is allowed only “when specified by law, upon 
which a court shall decide” (Art. 2. (2)). Bearing in mind the supremacy of the Constitution 
in relation to all other legal sources, no statutory provision should be allowed to deprive the 
court of its power to decide on the sentencing, at least in cases where the deprivation of lib-
erty is involved. While it could be argued that these statutory provisions do not deprive the 
defendant of his/her personal liberty any more than usually, as the court is still allowed to 
impose a milder sentence than the one proposed by the prosecutor, they strip the court of its 
power to deliver a harsher sentence if it considers the proposed one to be unduly lenient. On 
the other hand, the Constitution states that “courts shall administer justice according to the 
Constitution, law, international treaties and other valid sources of law” (Art. 115 (3)) and not 
according to some informal arrangements between the parties which obstruct the courts in 
fulfilling their constitutional duties. A further problem is the disregard for the victim’s rights 
and interests in this sort of procedure10 as he/she is not allowed to reject the proposed sen-
tence or at least formally express his/her opinion on its appropriateness. 
3. GErMANY: oN THE CroSSroAdS of PrINCIPLES ANd rEALITY
The German system of criminal justice is characterised by a principle which is very com-
mon in the civil law tradition, but nevertheless needs to be mentioned in a comparative study 
as it might be unfamiliar to lawyers from other legal systems. It is the Untersuchungsgrundsatz 
(also known as Amtsermittlungsgrundsatz, Inquisitionsmaxime, Amtsermittlungspflicht or Amt-
saufklärungspflicht) which is regulated in section 244 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
7  In its current form, Art. 417.a (6) and (7) is enacted by Art. 200 of the Act on Amendments to CCP, Official Gazette No. 143/2013. 
Ratio legis of the legislative proposal was to meet the requirements from the decision of the Constitutional Court that aimed 
to “harmonise the normative structure of the entire criminal procedure”, which has caused the abolishment of the summary 
procedure as a special type of procedure, followed by the transition of some of its former provisions to various other articles of 
the C-CCP, including Art. 417.a. See: Draft of the Act on the Amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, Ministry of Justice, 
November 2013, Zagreb, pp. 161.  
8  See, e.g., VSRH, I Kžm-31/16.
9  Croatian Constitution, Official Gazette, No. 56/1990, 135/1997, 113/2000, 28/2001, 76/2010, 5/2014.
10  Đurđević, Z., op. cit. Note 5, pp. 349-350.
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(Strafprozeßordnung – StPO)11: in order to establish the truth, the court shall, by virtue of office 
(ex officio), extend the gathering of evidence to all facts and means of proof which are relevant 
to the decision. In other words, the duty of the court is to establish the truth (Erforschung 
der Wahrheit). It is “the central concern” of the criminal procedure.12 In order to establish the 
truth, the court has a power and duty to act independently; this means, inter alia, that the 
court is not bound by the parties’ submissions when applying the criminal law (section 155 (2) 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
Legal effects of the defendant’s confession are thoroughly marked by this principle. To be 
more specific, confession does not remove the duty of the court to establish all the relevant 
facts of the case. Such confession is largely different from a guilty plea under the common law 
because a defendant who makes a confession is not necessarily convicted. The remainder of 
the main hearing does not only serve to determine the sentence, but also to establish if the 
confession corresponds to what had actually happened. This means that a confession is essen-
tially a piece of evidence like any other; although it does typically expedite the main hearing, 
particularly when it is factually substantiated, the Untersuchungsgrundsatz “shall not be sacri-
ficed in the interest of a simple and expedient settlement of the proceedings”.13
Before analysing the consequences of making a confession, a definition of this term shall 
be given from the perspective of the German law. Confession (Geständnis) is any admission of 
facts by the defendant with regard to the offence of which he/she is charged, which may be rel-
evant for determining guilt (Schuldfrage) or the sanctions (Rechtsfolgenentscheidung), regard-
less of whether these facts incriminate or exonerate the defendant.14 When determining guilt 
and sanctions, a confession is the object of free judicial assessment of evidence, which means 
that the trial court must be convinced of its accuracy if the conviction is to be based on it.15 Re-
stricting the reasoning of the conviction to the fact that the accused had confessed is therefore 
not acceptable. Rather, according to the established case-law, the court must examine whether 
a confession is coherent and whether there are any reasons to doubt its credibility with regard 
to the other available evidence.16 For instance, if the defendant incriminated any third parties 
in his confession, the court shall consider if the confession was possibly motivated by the de-
fendant’s hope to gain advantages. A “blanket” confession, i.e. a merely formal confession in 
which the defendant does not disclose any factual circumstances, cannot form the sole basis 
for the judgment, but even if a confession is thoroughly substantiated, it is not sufficient if the 
defendant’s recollection ability raises suspicions about the accuracy of his confession. Convic-
tion based solely on the confession is, however, possible, but only when the facts of the case 
are simple enough and the charge is sufficiently specific.17
11  Strafprozeßordnung (StPO) as published on 7 April 1987 (Official Gazette I, p. 1074, 1319), last amended by Article 49 of the Act 
from 21 December 2020 (Official Gazette I, p. 3096).
12  Krehl, Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung: StPO, C.H. BECK, 8. Aufl., 2019, StPO § 244 Rn. 28.
13  KK-StPO/Ott, Karlsruher Kommentar/StPO, C. H. BECK, 8. Aufl. 2019, StPO § 261 Rn. 92. 
14  KK-StPO/Diemer, 8. Aufl. 2019, StPO § 254 Rn. 3; BeckOK StPO/Ganter, 38. Ed. 1.10.2020, StPO § 254 Rn. 6; BGH MDR 1977, 
984 [H.]; RGSt 54, 126 (127) Beck Beck’scher Online-Kommentare.
15  Cf. BGH StV 1999, 410.
16  See BGH NStZ 2014, 53 and 170.
17  KK-StPO/Ott, Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung: StPO, C.H. BECK, 8. Aufl., 2019 StPO § 261 Rn. 94.
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In spite of the inquisitorial powers and duties of the German criminal courts, the Code 
of Criminal Procedure was amended in 2009 in order to allow agreements between the par-
ties and the court. The legislator introduced the “negotiated agreement” in order to formalise 
negotiations which, in reality, had already existed in German criminal proceedings, but were 
informal in nature. The newly introduced section 257c (Verständigung zwischen Gericht und 
Verfahrensbeteiligten) does not, however, represent a plea bargain in the strict sense as the 
court still plays a very prominent role in the proceedings: the whole process of reaching an 
agreement begins with its announcement as to what the agreement could possibly include. 
The agreement shall come into existence if both the defendant and the public prosecutor`s 
office agree to the court’s proposal, wherein defendant’s confession must be an integral part of 
the agreement. The agreement may only be reached with regard to the sanctions (Rechtsfolgen) 
which can be imposed by the judgment, to other procedural measures and to the conduct of 
the parties during the proceedings. As the duty of the court to establish the truth is prescribed 
by the law even where an agreement is reached, the guilty judgement (Schuldspruch) may not 
be the subject of the agreement. The court shall cease to be bound by the agreement if the 
relevant circumstances have been overlooked or if the defendant’s conduct in the proceedings 
does not correspond to the conduct upon which the proposal had been based; in such cases, 
the confession may not be used.
The recently introduced section 257c has been a subject of fervent criticism. Many authors 
believe that the German system of criminal justice should remain inherently opposed to any 
sort of negotiations between the parties. The “negotiated agreement” is regarded as a fun-
damental change of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is incompatible with the duty of 
the court to establish the relevant facts. Although the Untersuchungsgrundsatz is still formally 
valid, the very sense of the agreement is to avoid further inquiries, which means that the duty 
of the court to establish facts ex officio is still valid only in a rather vague sense. The reference 
to this principle in section 257c is regarded by some as nothing more than a “lip service”.18 
Another line of criticism concerns the right against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur), which is 
jeopardised if any pressure is exerted on the defendant to make a confession. Having in mind 
that the refusal to make a “deal” carries great risks for the defendant, as a much higher sen-
tence might be imposed, the nemo tenetur principle is certainly brought into question. Moreo-
ver, the principle of openness of the main hearing is also sometimes considered to be violated 
by negotiations between the parties.19
Notwithstanding the justified criticism of the recent legislative changes, it should be em-
phasised that the German law does not provide for a classic plea bargain which would directly 
and invariably prevent the court from determining the relevant facts after the defendant’s 
confession. In fact, a confession is often a key piece of evidence which considerably expe-
dites the main hearing, but it is not up to the parties to decide if the main hearing before 
the court is to be conducted or not and it is not up to the court to decide if it will exercise 
its power to establish the relevant facts or not. There is a duty, and not only a power, of the 
court to exercise its powers in order to establish the facts and apply the law, both in ordinary 
proceedings and in cases when there is a confession induced by negotiations. The court also 
18  Meyer-Goßner, L., Schmitt, Strafprozessordnung: Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, Nebengesetze und ergänzende Bestimmungen. 57. Aufl. 
2014, § 257c Rn 3.
19  Gierhake, K., Zur Begründung des Öffentlichkeitsgrundsatzes im Strafverfahren, JuristenZeitung No. 21, November 2013, pp. 1038.
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decides independently on the sentencing, without being obliged to follow any sanction-related 
suggestions from the prosecutor, regardless if these were self-induced or a result of an off-the-
record agreement between the parties. Even when confronted with a penalty order submission 
(Strafbefehlsantrag) by a state prosecutor, which is a means of summary criminal proceedings 
for minor offences, the court does not have to comply with the submission: if the court has 
reservations about deciding the case without a main hearing or if it wishes to deviate from the 
state prosecutor’s legal assessment of the case or to impose a legal consequence other than the 
requested one, it shall not issue a penalty order. Instead, the court shall proceed to the main 
hearing (section 408 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
4. AUSTrIA: THE oLd-SCHooL CIvIL LAW APProACH To CoNfESSIoN
The Untersuchungsgrundsatz is a central tenet of the Austrian criminal procedure. As laid 
down in section 3 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozeßordnung – StPO)20, crimi-
nal police, public prosecutor’s office and court have a duty to investigate the truth and clarify 
all facts which are of importance for the legal assessment (Beurteilung) of the offence and the 
defendant. This principle is even more prominent than in the German law as the very idea of 
negotiations between the parties is dismissed because of it. Although negotiations between 
the parties or between the defendant and the court are not expressly forbidden by the Austrian 
statutory law, the Supreme Court of Austria nevertheless finds any such negotiations – except 
for those held in accordance with the diversion proceedings, which are legally sanctioned – to 
be in contradiction with the duty of the court to establish the substantive truth (Erforschung 
der materiellen Wahreheit).21 Austrian statutory texts, while not expressly prohibitive to the 
very idea of negotiations, provide considerable support for the standpoint of the court. Sec-
tion 164 (4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure outlaws any promises (Versprechungen) which 
might be used to induce the defendant to confess or provide other information. Moreover, 
section 52 of the Code of Conduct for Courts of First and Second Instance (Geschäftsordnung 
für die Gerichte I. und II. Instanz) declares that the judge is prohibited from giving statements 
about the probable outcome of the proceedings outside of the hearing and that he/she should 
refrain from commenting on the likely content of the decision during the hearing.
Standing firm to the Untersuchungsgrundsatz, Austria remains loyal to the traditional civil 
law approach to criminal justice, in which the court is not perceived as an impartial referee, 
but as an active subject whose duty is to investigate all the relevant facts of the case and apply 
the law. In such a legal context, it is understandable that the confession of the defendant does 
not automatically imply a conviction as it does not discharge the court from the aforemen-
tioned duty. This means that even an exhaustive confession must be examined by the court in 
order to check its truthfulness. In other words, the courts and other relevant authorities (po-
lice and state prosecutor) are obliged to fully elucidate the relevant facts even if the defendant 
gives a confession, which is thus just another object of free judicial assessment of evidence.22
20  Strafprozessordnung (StPO) 1975,  BGBl. Nr. 631/1975 (WV), latest amendment BGBl. I Nr. 24/2020.
21  OGH 11 Os 77/04.
22  Kirchbacher in Fuchs, H., Ratz, E. (eds.), Wiener Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung, 88. Ed. (2009), § 164 Rz 2.
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5. ITALY: AN ELAborATE SYSTEM of NEGoTIATIoNS
Italian Code of Criminal Procedure (Codice di procedura penale,I-CCP) entered into force 
in 198923 and has been thoroughly amended since then by a variety of different statutes. The 
adoption of the Code was considered revolutionary because Italy was the first traditional-
ly inquisitorial judicial system to introduce various adversarial principles into the criminal 
procedure.24 An important feature of the Italian system is that the prosecutor is obligated to 
prosecute whenever there is sufficient evidence to charge the defendant.25 In Italian criminal 
procedure, evidence must be presented orally, in a public hearing, before the judge who then 
has to decide whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty.26 Any evidence that was collect-
ed or presented during the preliminary phase (investigation) may not form part of the case 
file, which serves as the basis for the judgment.27 The burden of proof is on the prosecutor. 
The defendant has the right to remain silent, he/she is not obligated to disclose anything 
regarding the charges and he/she is not obligated to provide any exculpatory evidence. If the 
prosecutor fails to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond any reasonable doubt, the judge must 
acquit the defendant.28 The defendant and the private parties can only be heard in trial at their 
own request. The Italian Constitutional Court considered the requirements of the defendant’s 
consent to be constitutional based on the assumption that the defendants may not be obliged 
to give testimony against themselves, nor can they be coercively brought to the court for the 
purposes of their examination.29
The defendant can be examined at the trial under the same terms that apply for the ex-
amination of witnesses. The hearing of the defendant usually takes place at the end of the 
evidence gathering procedure so that the defendant can properly assess whether to give oral 
evidence or not.30 Evidence gathering at the main hearing usually begins with the evidence 
presented by the public prosecutor and continues with the evidence presented by the other 
23  Codice di procedura penale, Aggiornato al D.L. 17 marzo 2020, n. 18. 
24  Frommann, M., Regulating Plea-Bargainig in Germany: Can the Italian Approach Serve as a Model to the Guarantee the Independence 
of German Judges?, Hanse Law Review Comparative Law, vol. 5, No. 1, 2009, p. 210. 
25  In Italy, the principle of legality of criminal prosecution is set as a constitutional principle in Art. 112 of the Constitution. See: 
Krstulović, A., Nagodbe stranaka u suvremenom kaznenom postupku, Hrvatsko udruženje za kaznene znanosti i praksu-MUP RH, 
Zagreb, 2007, p. 75. 
26  The judge makes his/her decision based on the case file that contains only the evidence that can be used by the judge at the end 
of the trial (Art. 431 I-CCP). See more: Perrodet, A., The Italian System, in European Criminal Procedures (eds. Delmas-Marty, M., 
Spencer, J.R.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p. 368-369.
27  There are two important exceptions to this rule. Firstly, this does not refer to the activity which cannot be repeated at the trial 
and, secondly, when the defendant gives his/her consent, written submissions can be inserted in the case file and used by the 
judge (Art. 493 (3) I-CCP). Ruggieri, F., Marcolini, S., Italy in Toward a Prosecutor for European Union, volume: 1: A comparative 
Analysis (ed. Katalin Ligeti), London: Hart Publishing, 2013., 395. 
28  Ibid., pp. 397. 
29  It should be noted that out-of-court statements of the defendant (statements that he/she has made in the pre-trial phase) can be 
admitted at the trial in cases when the defendant does not consent to the trial examination or is not present at hearing. Ruggeri, 
S., Audi Alteram Partem in Criminal Proceedings, Towards a Participatory Understanding of Criminal Justice in Europe and Latin 
America, Springer, 2017, p. 77-78. 
30  Ibid., pp. 77. 
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parties (Art. 498).31 I-CCP states that the court shall evaluate evidence specifying the obtained 
results and the criteria adopted in the rationale of the judgment (Art. 192 (1) I-CCP).
In Giuidizio Direttissimo, when the defendant during the questioning makes a full confes-
sion to the public prosecutor, the public prosecutor can decide to summon that defendant 
to appear at the hearing in front of a judge within the period of fifteen days from the day of 
entering of the offence in the register of notitiae criminis. The same time limit is valid for the 
defendants held in pre-trial detention (Art. 449 (5) I-CCP). This type of measure shows that 
in Italy the acknowledgment of guilt does not necessarily imply a guilty plea. In this situation, 
only the investigation is waived but the defendant’s case is promptly transferred to the court.32
One more diversion measure in Italy that can be connected with a guilty plea is the patteg-
giamento: application of the penalty at the request of the parties (Art. 444-448 I-CCP). Patteg-
giamento is considered neither a guilty judgement33 nor a plea bargain. It is a request that can 
be made during a preliminary hearing (Art. 446 (1) I-CCP) or in exceptional cases during the 
trial (Art. 448 (1) I-CPP)34 by the prosecutor and the defendant jointly or separately, but in 
that case only with the consent of the other party (that did not make the request). Request can 
be made only in cases of criminal offence where the specific maximum sentence does not ex-
ceed 5 years of imprisonment (Art. 444 (1) I-CCP). Some criminal offences are excluded from 
this, e.g. organised crime, sex-related criminal offences and cases of habitual and repeated 
offenders. The request must be submitted to the judge and must contain the type and measure 
of the sanction and the circumstances that should be applied in that specific case.35
When the judge receives the request, he/she will decide on the admissibility of the agree-
ment based on the case file in several steps. First, he/she must check if there are any grounds 
for the acquittal according to Art. 129 I-CCP.36 The judge can accept or reject the parties’ agree-
ment. Before the judge decides, he/she must verify whether the legal qualification of the crim-
inal offence is correct and whether the proposed punishment is adequate taking under account 
all mitigating and aggravating circumstances of the case. It is important to note that the judge 
not only controls the legality of the proposed sentence but also examines whether it can fulfil 
the general and special purpose of sanctioning (Art. 444(2) I-CCP). The judge can reject the 
agreement if he/she finds that the balancing of incriminating and exculpatory indicia is con-
ducted incorrectly.37 The judge can request from the defendant to appear in order to verify the 
31  Perrodet, A., op. cit. Note 26, pp. 381-382.
32  Coscas-Williams, B., Alberstain, M.: A Patchwork of doors: accelerated proceedings in continental criminal justice systems, New 
Criminal Law Review, vol. 22., No. 4., fall 2019, p. 610. 
33  This institution does not involve any admission of guilt because that would violate the presumption of innocence. Ibid., pp. 605.
  The scholars` opinion is that patteggiamento does not allow for a conviction without the judge having previously established the 
defendant`s guilt. The Constitutional Court also confirmed that in patteggiammento there is an obligation to establish guilt, but 
that requirement was limited by the nature of this simplified procedure. Frommann, M., op. cit. Note 24, pp. 212-214. 
34  Coscas-Williams, B., Alberstain, M., op. cit. Note 32, pp. 605. This is considered to be an exception because the main rule is that 
the request must be presented to the judge at the preliminary hearing or until the initiation of the trial in a specific procedure 
(Art. 446 (1) I-CCP). Law amendment from 2003 (Law no. 134 from 2003) formed a transitional regime in which it was stated 
that the request could also be made during the main hearing, and the Italian Court of Cassation decided that the Law refers only 
to “the first instance main hearing”. See: Krstulović, A., op. cit. Note 25, pp. 79 (note 219). 
35  Carić, M., Skraćeni oblici kaznenog postupka, doktorska disertacija, Pravni fakultet Sveučilišta u Splitu, 2012., p. 214. 
36  Frommann, M., op. cit. Note 24, pp. 211. 
37  Ibid., pp. 211-212.
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voluntariness of his/her request or consent (Art. 446(5) I-CCP). If the judge accepts the agree-
ment of the parties, he/she is bound by the sentence that was agreed by the parties and in his/
her decision explain the reasons why he/she accepted the agreement.38 If the judge rejects the 
agreement, the file is sent back to the ordinary proceedings.39
In the Italian case law, there were different opinions about the role of the court in pat-
teggiamento. In 1990, the Italian Constitutional Court confirmed that the role of the judge 
is not simply to check and confirm the parties’ agreement but that he/she has the authori-
ty to control not only the formal but also the material preconditions of the agreements and 
whether the proposed sanction is in accordance with the facts of the case and the purpose of 
sanctioning. If the court finds that the proposed sanction is not appropriate, it can reject the 
agreement.40 If a party considers that the proposed sentence is not acceptable, it can reject it. 
If the defendant does so, he does not have to give any reasoning for his decision, while in the 
opposite situation the prosecution must provide the judge with the reasons why they refused 
the agreement.41 If the defendant makes a request that the prosecutor disapproves of or that 
is rejected by the preliminary investigation judge, prior to the opening of the first instance 
trial, the defendant can submit his/her request again and the court shall immediately deliver 
the judgment, if it considers that the request is well-founded. The request cannot be further 
submitted with another court (Art. 448(1) I-CCP). If the judge believes that the prosecutor 
refused the defendant’s request on unjustified grounds, he/she will follow the same procedure 
even after the closure of the first instance trial or in the remedy trial. This means that in those 
situations, the sentencing does not occur when anticipated but subsequently, i.e. after the 
closure of the first instance trial or remedy trial (Art. 448(1) I-CCP).42 The prosecutor has the 
right to appeal that decision (Art. 448(2) I-CCP). The procedure of patteggiamento is closed for 
public and the legislation does not provide for the participation of the victim in the agreement.
6. frANCE: A TYPICAL “MIxEd” SYSTEM
In France, criminal procedure is regulated by the Code de procédure pénale43  (Code of Crim-
inal Procedure; F-CCP) that was adopted in 1958 by an ordinance, as a redrafting of the Na-
poleonic Code d’instruction criminelle from 1808.44 The current French criminal procedure is 
considered a mixed system, including the adversarial principle that is enshrined in the intro-
ductory article of the F-CCP. The French criminal procedure has many accusatorial features, 
38  Frommann, M., op. cit. note 24, pp. 212.
39  Coscas-Williams, B., Alberstain, M., op. cit. Note 32, pp. 606. 
40  Coscas-Williams, B., Alberstain, M., op. cit. Note 32, pp. 605. Krstulović, A., op. cit. Note 25, pp. 83, 89.
41  Krstulović, A., op. cit. Note 25, pp. 80.
42  Ibid., pp. 80. 
43  Code de procédure pénale, Version en vigueur au 08 décembre 2020, Code de procédure pénale in French:  https://www.
legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/texte_lc/LEGITEXT000006071154/2021-01-08/.
44  Tricot, J., France in Toward a Prosecutor for the European Union, A comparative Analysis (ed. Katalin Ligeti), London: Hart 
Publishing, vol. 1, 2013, pp. 222. 
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but the inquisitorial tradition can also be noticed.45 The principle of opportunity is the basis 
of criminal prosecution in France.46 In cases when the defendant is committed to the trial,47 
he/she must be questioned by a judge before the witnesses are heard (Art. 272, 328,48 442 and 
536 F-CCP). The defendant`s attorney, the prosecution, and the victim all have the right to 
question the defendant and other witnesses at the trial. Since 2000, they may do this directly 
by requesting the president of the court to allow them to speak (Art. 312 and 442-1 F-CCP).49 
But the judge still leads the examination of the case on the basis of having read the case file,50 
which is a typical inquisitorial feature. The trial judge asks the questions, leads and steers the 
hearing, and determines the value of the evidence submitted in each case.51 Regarding the 
evaluation of evidence in France, the basic rule is that a criminal offence can be established by 
any evidence and the judge is free to evaluate these evidence as he/she wishes.52 F-CPP in Art. 
428 states that “confessions, as any other type of evidence, are left to the free evaluation of the 
judges“.53 This means that even the confession from the defendant at the main hearing must 
be evaluated by the judge as any other evidence.
In order to reduce the growing caseload of criminal courts, F-CPP implemented a wide 
range of alternative procedures.54 One of these new measures requires the acknowledgment 
of guilt from the defendant, comparution sur reconnaissance préalable de culpabilité, otherwise 
known as CRPC. CRPC was introduced in F-CCP in 2004 and is often considered to be inspired 
by the US plea bargain. CRPC applies to criminal offences that impose a prison sentence of less 
than 10 years55 and it can be proposed by the prosecutor or the defendant or his/her attorney. 
The sentence proposed to the defendant may not exceed one-year imprisonment or half of 
the maximum sentence for that criminal offence. First the prosecutor, defendant and his/her 
attorney have a brief discussion about the facts of the case. The attorney must be present dur-
ing the defendant’s confession and the plea bargain from the prosecutor.56 The defendant has 
ten days to decide whether to accept or reject the plea bargain made by the prosecutor. If the 
45  Hodgson, J., Guilty Pleas and the Changing Role of the Prosecutor in French Criminal Justice, Warwick School of Law Research Paper, 
No. 2010/15, pp. 9.
46 Art. 40. F-CCP. Krstulović, A., op. cit. Note 25, pp. 106.  
47  Currently, a full trial based on a lengthy phase of hearing in the adversarial method and a long investigation in the inquisitorial 
system is considered the option of last resort in France. Coscas-Williams, B., Alberstein M., A., op. cit. Note 32, pp. 615.
48  Art. 328. F-CCP states that the judge must inform the accused about his/her right during the hearing including the right “…
to provide the answers to the questions or to remain silent”, after which the judge questions the defendant and takes his/her 
deposition. (Modifié par LOI n°2014-535 du 27 mai 2014 - art. 8).
49  Dervieux, V.,The French system, in European Criminal Procedures, (eds. Delmas-Marty, M., Spencer, J.R.) Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, pp. 253. 
50  Hodgson, J., op. cit. Note 45, pp. 9. 
51  Coscas-Williams, B., Alberstein M., op. cit. Note 32, pp. 597.
52  Dervieux, V., op. cit. Note 49, pp. 263. 
53  Art. 428 F-CPP: “L’aveu, comme tout élément de preuve, est laissé à la libre appréciation des juges.” (Modifié par Loi 93-1013 
1993-08-24 art. 28 JORF 25 août 1993 en vigueur le 2 septembre 1993).
54  Coscas-Williams, B., Alberstain M., op. cit. Note 32, pp. 600-604. See also: Krstulović, A., op. cit. note 25, p. 106 -111. 
55  This was modified in 2011. Previously, these proceedings only referred to criminal offences imposing a fine or a prison sentence 
of 5 years or less. The CRPC also excludes certain grave criminal offences such as rape and murder. 
56  Representation by an attorney during CRPC is mandatory. In practice, defendants who cannot afford an attorney but do not 
qualify for legal aid or those who do not wish to pay for an attorney are excluded from the CRPC. See: Soubise, L., Guilty Pleas 
in an Inquisitorial Setting – an Empirical Study of France (September 2018). Journal of Law and Society, Cardiff University Law 
School, Vol. 45, Issue 3, 2018, p. 417.
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defendant refuses to plead guilty or rejects the plea bargain, his/her case will be sent to trial. If 
he/she pleads guilty and accepts the plea bargain from the prosecutor, the procedure moves to 
the second phase referred to as homologation (l’homologation), where the judge must confirm 
or reject the plea bargain during a public hearing. During homologation, the court has the 
power to examine the procedural truth.57 This means that if the judge has any doubts about 
the case or thinks that the proposed sentence is not proportional to the circumstances of the 
case, he/she will reject the proposal and send the case to trial. It is important to notice that the 
court has the power to accept or to reject the sentence proposal, but he has no power to amend 
it.58 When the plea bargain is not accepted, the parties cannot resort to it later in the trial (Art. 
485-14 F-CCP). The victim is informed about the procedure, he/she can appear before the 
court with an attorney, become a civil party and demand compensation (Art. 495-13 F-CCP).  
CRPC was introduced in France with the aim to expedite the disposal of cases, but its use 
in practice still remains relatively low, especially in comparison to a guilty plea in the UK. In 
England and Wales, over 78% of defendants prosecuted by the CPS at the magistrates’ court 
and over 70% at the Crown Court pleaded guilty in 2016/17, while in France CRPC accounted 
for merely 6.4% of prosecutable cases in 2016.59
7.  ENGLANd ANd WALES: CoNTrACTUAL ATTITUdES ToWArdS 
THE GUILTY PLEA 
As opposed to a great number of civil law jurisdictions, including Germany and Austria 
with their Legalitätsprinzip, the prosecution is not mandatory in most common law jurisdic-
tion, which means that the prosecutor is not legally required to press charges even though 
there is enough evidence to support indictment. The Code for Crown Prosecutors, which is 
issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions, sets out the general principles Crown Prose-
cutors should abide by when making decisions about the cases and states that “in every case 
where there is sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution or to offer an out-of-court disposal, 
prosecutors must go on to consider whether a prosecution is required in the public interest” 
(section 4.9). Moreover, there is no duty of the court to establish the facts ex officio, which is, 
on the other hand, the central tenet of the German and Austrian criminal law. This inherent 
flexibility produces incentives for informal plea deals, which are not viewed as something that 
would jeopardise the very foundations of criminal justice.
57  In practice, this validation from the judge has often been described as “quick and artificial” because the judges often just confirm 
facts that have been already established. Ibid., pp. 414.
58  Coscas-Williams, B., Alberstain M., op. cit. Note 32, pp. 600-604. See also: Hodgson, J., op. cit. Note 45, pp. 11-14. 
59  In French practice, CRPC procedure usually takes around 5 months and is typically used for offences like driving under influence 
without a licence, domestic violence (minor assault and harassments) and minor frauds and thefts. It is interesting to note 
that the defendants in CRPC usually had prior convictions. Some authors believe that the entire procedure is in the hands 
of the prosecutors who are under a considerable pressure to prosecute the case quickly and efficiently, which then results in 
bureaucratisation of prosecutorial decisions. In many cases, the prosecutors make their own decisions by using standardised 
tables and instructions, with no reflection on the individual elements of the case. See more: Soubise, L., op. cit. Note 56, pp. 408-
414.
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Having in mind that the court is not required to establish “substantive” truth in the crimi-
nal proceedings, the defendant`s guilty plea means that he/she accepts the assertion that he/
she has committed the incriminating offence. Both in common and in civil law jurisdictions, 
the purpose of the trial (or main hearing) is to address the accusations brought by the pros-
ecution, but in common law jurisdictions the trial is not considered to be a necessary part of 
the criminal proceedings: it is up to the defendant to decide whether he/she will exercise the 
right to a trial or waive it by pleading guilty.
Acceptance of the model in which the defendant loses the right to a trial by pleading guilty 
has a profound effect on the powers and duties of the court following a guilty plea. The most 
important thing to emphasise, at least from the civil law perspective, is the fact that the court 
may not examine whether the plea is grounded in reality (“substantive” truth). In the magis-
trates’ court, if the defendant pleads guilty and the court is satisfied that the plea represents 
a clear acknowledgement of guilt, the court may convict the defendant without collecting evi-
dence (The Criminal Procedure Rules 2020, section 24.7). Similarly, in the Crown Court, if the 
defendant pleads guilty to an offence and the court is satisfied that the plea represents a clear 
acknowledgement of guilt, the court is not required to collect evidence unless it needs to de-
termine the facts for the sentencing phase (The Criminal Procedure Rules 2020, section 25.4). 
Acknowledgement of guilt is considered to be “clear” when it is equivocal. If it is ambiguous, 
e.g. when the defendant “qualifies what purports to be a guilty plea with words suggesting that 
he/she is really putting forward a defence”, the court must try to resolve the ambiguity. If it 
remains unequivocal, the court must reject it and hear evidence.60
A guilty plea in the magistrates’ court may be withdrawn by the defendant before the sen-
tencing. His/her motion to withdraw a guilty plea must explain why it would be unjust not 
to allow the defendant to withdraw the guilty plea, identify any witness or other proposed 
evidence and say whether the defendant waives the legal professional privilege (The Criminal 
Procedure Rules 2020, section 24.10). In the Crown Court, a party may vacate a guilty plea 
before the final disposal of the case. The motion must explain why it would be unjust for the 
guilty plea to remain unchanged, indicate the evidence the applicant wishes to present, iden-
tify any proposed witnesses and indicate whether the legal professional privilege is waived 
(The Criminal Procedure Rules 2020, section 25.5). Having in mind that the right to withdraw 
or vacate a guilty plea is very restricted, it is not surprising that the right to appeal the guilty 
plea convictions is even more limited. In case of a guilty plea, the appeal from the magis-
trates’ court to the Crown Court is allowed only against the sentence (Magistrates’ Courts 
Act, section 108), unless the magistrates’ court treated an equivocal plea as a guilty plea, in 
which case the defendant may appeal against the conviction as well. Appeal from the Crown 
Court is heard by the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, which shall allow an appeal against 
conviction if they think that the conviction is unsafe and shall dismiss such an appeal in any 
other case (Criminal Appeal Act 1968, section 2). Although the Court of Appeal has an “almost 
unlimited power to declare any conviction unsafe”, there is nevertheless “reluctance to allow 
appeals against guilty plea convictions”; in nearly all cases, “defendants can only appeal on the 
basis that their pleas were involuntary or equivocal”.61 The reluctance to allow appeals includes 
60  Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2018, D.22.4.; McPeake, Criminal Litigation and Sentencing, 23rd Edition, 2011, p. 108.
61  Richard Nobles & David Schiff, The Supervision of Guilty Pleas by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales – Workable Relationships 
and Tragic Choices, Criminal Law Forum, volume 31, 2020, p. 513–552.
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cases where the defendants “may have succumbed to the pressure to plead guilty arising from 
sentence discounts” as well as appeals “on the basis of new evidence that throws doubt on 
defendants’ guilt”.62
To conclude, a guilty plea is generally precluded from any subsequent control as to its 
truthfulness, either by a trial court or by an appellate court. The reason behind this is that an 
innocent defendant should not have admitted to the facts which are not true in the first place. 
As far as he/she voluntarily waived his/her right to a trial, he/she cannot argue that the act 
of waiving was unjust. Such “contractual justification” is opposed by a considerable number of 
authors, some of which are pointing out that it “ignores the crucial difference between civil 
and criminal proceedings. The community as a whole normally has no independent interest 
in establishing whether a civil defendant did or did not commit the incriminating acts. False 
convictions, by contrast, impact the community by removing attention from those actually 
responsible for crimes, and by wasting resources by punishing and rehabilitating the wrong 
persons.”63
As well as causing relinquishment of the right to a trial, a guilty plea has a profound ef-
fect on sentencing. The Definite Guideline issued by the Sentencing Council for England and 
Wales, in accordance with the Coroners and Justice Act, expressly states that its purpose “is 
to encourage those who are going to plead guilty to do so as early in the court process as 
possible”. Guilty plea produces a sentence reduction at the first stage of the proceedings as 
well as at a later stage, but while a guilty plea indicated at the first stage produces a reduction 
of one-third, the reduction is made to a maximum of one-tenth when the guilty plea is first 
indicated to the court on the first day of trial. But even when the defendant pleads guilty at 
an early stage, the sentencing powers still remain in the hands of the court, notwithstanding 
the fact of whether the guilty plea was based on an agreement between the parties or on the 
defendant’s own initiative.
As a conclusion based on the comparative overview: in European countries based on the 
civil law tradition (German, France, Austria), the guilt of the defendant should always be es-
tablished by evidence and the judge remains obligated to establish the material truth even in 
situations when the defendant, either at the trial or in the pre-trial phase, admits that he/she 
is guilty. The court has no obligation to believe the defendant`s confession and is free to assess 
such evidence upon its own discretion.64 This is a considerable difference with respect to the 
common law systems (England) where the defendant`s guilty plea means that the prosecution 
is released from its duty to bring evidence to trial and the court is obligated to convict.65
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid.
64  Spencer, J. R., op. cit. Note 3, pp. 594-595.
65  This can be a problem in cases where the defendant pleads guilty for the criminal offence, but disputes some facts of the case, for 
example the facts that could increase or reduce his/her penalty or could affect the type of criminal offence in question. In those 
situations, the judge has two options: he/she can hear witnesses or request more evidence or accept the version of the facts that 
was presented to him/her by the defendant. Ibid, pp. 594-595.
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8. CoNCLUdING SUGGESTIoNS To THE CroATIAN LEGISLATUrE
The traditional civil law model of criminal proceedings rests on the inquisitorial principle 
(Untersuchungsgrundsatz) which prescribes the duty of the court to establish the relevant facts 
of the case. This means that the defendant`s guilt should always be established by evidence. All 
of the analysed systems that cherish this principle have nevertheless created some alternative 
or less strict approaches to fact-finding, which usually rest on the idea of consensual justice. 
Among these countries, Austria has remained most faithful to the inquisitorial principle (with 
diversion as an exception), while Germany, France and Italy have legalised and regulated some 
types of agreements between parties, albeit with different approaches to the scope of negoti-
ations, rights of victims, stages of proceedings where the negotiations may take place and the 
level of court activity during the negotiations and after the reach of the agreement. However, 
all of these consensual proceedings have a common denominator: whenever a court becomes 
involved in a consensual procedure, its role is never reduced to a ritualistic one. From the 
perspective of constitutional division of powers, it is inappropriate to engage judiciary in a 
substantively meaningless procedure which is nothing more than an homage to an agreement 
between the parties or to a proposal made by one of them. Moreover, as shown by the English 
law, the prominence of judiciary in the consensual proceedings is not a civil law peculiarity, 
but also a feature of common law systems: the sentencing powers remain firmly in the hands 
of the court, which is obliged to respect the law instead of some mutually brokered deal on a 
sentence.
Having this in mind, it is surprising that the Croatian legislator has decided to establish 
a system in which, according to Art. 417.a (6) and (7) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the 
court may not fully reject a plea bargain offered by the state prosecutor during the main hear-
ing if the defendant confesses to the indictment. This is surely an example of a contractual 
approach to the effects of a confession, and, as such, it is rather ambiguous from the consti-
tutional viewpoint. In fact, such provisions do not naturally and logically fit into the Croatian 
system of criminal justice, which is still based on the Untersuchungsgrundsatz and, according-
ly, judge-dominated both in the procedural and substantive respect. The fact that the Croa-
tian criminal courts are obliged to examine the confession in terms of its truthfulness clearly 
shows that it is considered as a piece of evidence rather than a guilty plea. It thus derives that 
the trial court should be allowed to evaluate the aggravating circumstances accordingly and, 
in doing so, be bound only by the law, and not by any sort of sentence-related proposals of the 
involved parties, especially as these can be a result of unregulated negotiations between the 
parties disregarding the interests of the victim and the constitutionally prescribed role of the 
judiciary. In our view, these provisions should be abolished in the course of a comprehensive 
reform of various forms of consensual procedures which are currently excessive in number 
and inconsistent in the Croatian criminal legislation. Of course, this does not mean that each 
and every consensual element of the Croatian criminal procedure should be abandoned, but 
whatever approach is taken, it should be borne in mind that none of the analysed countries 
provides for a deal between the parties at the mean hearing in a criminal case which would ef-
fectively strip the court of its key powers. The quest for a better, healthier and constitutionally 
aligned legislative framework in Croatia could be based on German, French or Italian model. 
To sum up, the court should be allowed either to determine the boundaries of negotiation 
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before they take place or, otherwise, to control if the proposed sanction is in accordance with 
the facts of the case and the purpose of sanctioning, including the right to reject the proposal.
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PrIZNANJE oPTUžENIKA NA GLAvNoJ rASPrAvI U HrvATSKoJ 
I PorEdbENoPrAvNIM SUSTAvIMA: SAMo JoŠ JEdAN doKAZ, 
PrIZNANJE KrIvNJE ILI PrEŠUTNI SPorAZUM?
Sažetak
Učinci okrivljenikova priznanja nisu jednaki u svim pravnim poredcima. U kontinental-
nim pravnim sustavima, priznanje krivnje najčešće se tretira kao i svaki drugi dokaz, dok u 
common law sustavima istinitost okrivljenikova priznanja sud ne propituje. Međutim, to na-
čelno razlikovanje ne vrijedi uvijek i svugdje. U hrvatskom pravu, ako se optuženik za kazneno 
djelo za koje je propisana novčana kazna ili kazna zatvora do pet godina na raspravi očituje kri-
vim u odnosu na sve točke optužbe i suglasi sa sankcijom koju je predložio državni odvjetnik, 
sud mu u presudi ne smije izreći strožu kaznu od predložene. Takvo zakonsko rješenje može 
potaknuti prešutne dogovore i neregulirane pregovore između stranaka nakon što je raspra-
va već započela, a nije jasno je li to zakonodavac imao na umu kada je donosio ovu odredbu. 
Kako bi navedenu problematiku istražili iz šire perspektive, autori su u radu analizirali hr-
vatsko, njemačko, austrijsko, francusko, talijansko i englesko pravo, s naglaskom na položaju 
optuženika nakon priznanja na raspravi, učincima priznanja, ulozi suda u daljnjem postupku i 
pravima žrtve. Nakon usporedne analize, autori iznose svoje mišljenje o trenutačnom zakon-
skom rješenju u Hrvatskoj, a posebno o čl. 417.a st. 6. i 7. Zakona o kaznenom postupku i daju 
prijedlog zakonskih izmjena.
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kazneni postupak 
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